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I. INTRODUCTION
Almost exactly two hundred and thirty years after the enactment of
the Copyright Act of 1790, 1 the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that copyright
protections do not apply to Georgia’s official annotated code. 2 In so doing,
the Court expanded the rule it adopted in its first copyright case, Wheaton
v. Peters, which prevents judges from copyrighting their written opinions
and transferring them to the court’s reporter of decisions, to its most recent
copyright case. 3 In Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, Inc., the Court’s
majority ruled that the nineteenth-century era government edicts doctrine
also excludes works created by legislators, acting in the course of their
legislative duties, from copyright protection. 4
This Paper begins with an overview of the facts and history of
Public.Resource.Org, 5 including a review of the various stakeholders and
ǂ Andy

Taylor is a student in Mitchell Hamline School of Law’s part-time evening program.
From 2010–2019, Andy was a policy staffer in the U.S. House of Representatives, where he
served in senior positions for two members of Congress and on the staff of the Financial
Services Committee and the Foreign Affairs Committee. He currently works in digital legal
operations and data privacy for a Midwest-based lending company and serves on the board
of directors of the Borgen Project, a non-profit organization that works to make poverty
reduction a focus of U.S. foreign policy. Additionally, Andy is a Financial Industry
Regulatory Authority (FINRA) Dispute Resolution Arbitrator and a Certified Information
Privacy Manager (CIPM).
Copyright Act of 1790, 124, 1st Cong. § 1 (1790).
Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, Inc., 140 S. Ct. 1498, 1504 (2020).
Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. 591, 668 (1834).
Public.Resource.Org, 140 S. Ct. at 1508.
Infra Section II.A.
1
2
3
4
5
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their interests in the case. 6 An analysis of the Supreme Court’s ruling
follows. 7 The analysis evaluates the rule adopted by the majority and
compares it to the approach taken by the Eleventh Circuit. In particular,
this Paper questions the Court’s emphasis on the construct of “author”
under the Copyright Act in determining whether a work is a law. 8 Although
both courts found for Public.Resource.Org, this Paper argues that the victor
would have been better off with the framework the Eleventh Circuit used to
conclude that the Official Code of Georgia Annotated (“OCGA”) was
uncopyrightable under the government edicts doctrine. 9
Finally, this Paper explores what “law” is and the implications of the
Court’s approach to this question (at least in the context of copyright) on
separate but related litigation to which Public.Resource.Org is a party. In
short, the decision is a win for the general principle that no one owns the
law, but it does not go so far as to free up the “raw materials” of democracy
as Public.Resource.Org and its supporters might have hoped. This has
implications for closely connected legal and policy disputes over the
copyrightability of privately authored standards later incorporated by
reference into federal, state, and local law.
II. THE PUBLIC.RESOURCE.ORG DECISION

A.

Facts and Procedural History

It is long settled that law is not copyrightable. 10 A trio of cases
decided by the Supreme Court in the 1800s addressed questions of
copyright in the context of judicial decisions. 11 In Wheaton v. Peters, the
official reporter of the Supreme Court unsuccessfully argued it had been
Infra Section II.C.
Infra Section II.B.
Infra Sections III.A–B.
Infra Section III.C.
See, e.g., L. Ray Patterson & Craig Joyce, Monopolizing the Law: The Scope of Copyright
Protection for Law Reports and Statutory Compilations, 36 UCLA L. REV. 719, 723 (1989);
Robert M. Gellman, Twin Evils: Government Copyright and Copyright-Like Controls over
Government Information, 45 SYRACUSE L. REV. 999, 1000–02 (1995); Deborah Tussey,
Owning the Law: Intellectual Property Rights in Primary Law, 9 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP.
MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 173, 174 (1998); Michael W. Carroll, Open Access Publishing and the
Future of Legal Scholarship: The Movement for Open Access Law, 10 LEWIS & CLARK L.
REV. 741, 742 (2006); Katie Fortney, Ending Copyright Claims in State Primary Legal
Materials: Toward an Open Source Legal System, 102 L. LIBR. J. 59, 61 (2010); Beth Ford,
Open Wide the Gates of Legal Access, 93 OR. L. REV. 539, 540 (2014); Elizabeth Scheibel,
No Copyright in the Law: A Basic Principle, yet a Continuing Battle, 7 CYBARIS 350 (2016);
Leslie A. Street & David R. Hansen, Who Owns the Law? We Must Restore Public
Ownership of Legal Publishing, 26:2 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 205, 206 (2019).
See Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. 591 (1834); Banks v. Manchester, 128 U.S. 244 (1888);
6
7
8
9

10

11

Callaghan v. Myers, 128 U.S. 617 (1888).
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gifted a copyright in the judicial opinions it reported. 12 Unpersuaded, the
Court ruled “that no reporter has or can have any copyright in the written
opinions delivered by this court: and the judges thereof cannot confer on
any reporter any such right.” 13 Some five decades later, the Court heard a
similar case concerning the copyrightability of state judicial opinions. In
Banks v. Manchester, the Court elaborated on its Wheaton ruling,
“explaining that ‘the judge who, in his judicial capacity, prepares the opinion
or decision, the statement of the case and the syllabus or head note’ cannot
‘be regarded as their author or their proprietor, in the sense of [the
Copyright Act].’” 14 However, in Callaghan v. Myers, the Court upheld a
reporter’s copyright claim over “the matter which is the result of his
intellectual labor.” 15
The aforementioned cases comprise the government edicts
doctrine. 16 According to the majority in Public.Resource.Org:
These cases establish a straightforward rule: Because
judges are vested with the authority to make and interpret
the law, they cannot be the “author” of the works they
prepare “in the discharge of their judicial duties.” This rule
applies both to binding works (such as opinions) and to
non-binding works (such as headnotes and syllabi). It does
not apply, however, to works created by government
officials (or private parties) who lack the authority to make
or interpret the law, such as court reporters. 17
While these cases long-ago addressed the copyrightability (or lack
thereof) of judge-made law, and modern cases have similarly held that state
statutes and local ordinances lack copyright protection, 18
Public.Resource.Org presented a new question for the Court concerning
12
13

Wheaton, 33 U.S. at 614–15.
Id. at 668.

Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, Inc., 140 S. Ct. 1498, 1506 (2020) (quoting Banks, 128
U.S. at 253).
See Callaghan, 128 U.S. at 645, 647 (recognizing all but the opinions of the court as
copyrightable, including a title-page, a statement of the entry of copyright, a list of the judges
composing the court, a table of the cases reported in the volume, in alphabetical order, a
head-note or syllabus to each opinion, with the names of the respective counsel, and their
arguments in some cases, a statement of facts, and an index, arranged alphabetically, and
consisting substantially of a reproduction of the head-notes).
Shyamkrishna Balganesh & Peter S. Menell, The Uncopyrightability of Edicts of
Government, PENN LAW: LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP REPOSITORY 1, 3 (2019),
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3113&context=faculty_schola
rship [https://perma.cc/2BDC-HUYY].
Public.Resource.Org, 140 S. Ct. at 1507 (internal citations omitted).
See Davidson v. Wheelock, 27 F. 61 (C.C.D. Minn. 1866); Howell v. Miller, 9 F. 129 (6th
Cir. 1898); Bldg. Off. & Code Admin. v. Code Tech., Inc., 628 F.2d 730 (1st Cir. 1980);
Veeck v. S. Bldg. Code Cong. Int’l, Inc., 293 F.3d 791 (5th Cir. 2002) (en banc).
14

15

16

17
18

980

MITCHELL HAMLINE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 47

the copyrightability of annotated law. The issue arose out of a dispute
between Georgia’s Code Revision Commission (OCGA)—an arm of the
state’s General Assembly—and Public.Resource.Org, a “one-man” 19 nonprofit dedicated to “making government information more accessible.” 20
The Commission was originally established in 1977 to organize
Georgia’s statutes into a single code. 21 State law expressly distinguishes
between the “statutory portion” of the OCGA and the annotated portions. 22
The legislature was also careful to note that “[a]ll historical citations, title
and chapter analyses, and notes set out in [the OCGA] are given for the
purpose of convenient reference and do not constitute part of the law.” 23 In
2006, the Commission contracted with Matthew Bender & Co., Inc., a
division of the LexisNexis Group, to assemble “not only the statutory
provisions, but also ‘annotations, captions, catchlines, headings, history
lines, editorial notes, cross-references, indices, title and chapter analyses,
research references, amendment notes, Code Commission notes, and other
material related to or included in such Code at the direction of the
Commission.’” 24 The work for hire 25 contract “state[d] that any copyright in
the OCGA vests exclusively in ‘the State of Georgia, acting through the
Commission.’” 26 While the contract required LexisNexis to make a free
version of the unannotated code available on its website, it gave LexisNexis
the exclusive right “to publish and sell the [annotated OCGA] as a printed
publication, on CD–ROM and in an online version.” 27 By some accounts,
LexisNexis sold copies of the OCGA for prices ranging from $404 to
$1,200. 28
Steven Levy, The Internet’s Own Instigator, WIRED (Sep. 12, 2016, 12:00 AM),
https://www.wired.com/2016/09/the-internets-own-instigator/
[https://perma.cc/7KCZCF7X].
PUBLIC.RESOURCE.ORG, https://public.resource.org/ [https://perma.cc/RJM7-ZA7Q].
Public.Resource.Org, 140 S. Ct. at 1504.
GA. CODE. ANN. § 1-1-1 (2021).
Id. § 1-1-7.
Code Revision Comm’n v. Public.Resource.Org, Inc., 244 F. Supp. 3d 1350, 1353 (N.D.
Ga. 2017), rev'd, 906 F.3d 1229 (11th Cir. 2018), aff'd, Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, Inc.,
140 S. Ct. 1498 (2020).
The Copyright Act of 1976 defines “work made for hire” as “a work prepared by an
employee within the scope of his or her employment,” for which the employer is “considered
the author” for copyright purposes. Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 201(b) (2021).
“Unless the parties expressly provide otherwise in a written agreement, the employer initially
‘owns all of the rights comprised in the copyright.’” Brief for the United States as Amici
Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 3, Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, Inc., 140 S. Ct. 1498
(2020) (No. 18-1150), 2019 WL 4167076 [hereinafter Amicus Brief for U.S. Supporting
Petitioner].
Public.Resource.Org, 140 S. Ct. at 1505.
Code Revision Comm’n, 244 F. Supp. 3d at 1354.
Molly Davis, Supreme Court Should Stop Georgia from Charging Citizens $404 per Year
to
Read
Their
Own
Laws,
THE
FEDERALIST
(Nov.
6,
2019),
19

20
21
22
23
24

25

26
27
28
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In defiance of takedown notices, 29 Public.Resource.Org “printed
volumes and supplements of the [OCGA], scanned them all, and then
posted those copies on its website.” 30 The organization even went so far as
to mail digital copies of the OCGA directly to Georgia state legislators, in a
brazen attempt to stir controversy. 31 In 2015, the Commission filed suit
against Public.Resource.Org for copyright infringement and sought
injunctive relief. 32 In its complaint, Georgia’s lawyers likened
Public.Resource.Org’s actions to a “strategy of mass publication
terrorism.” 33 The district court found for the Commission but noted the
“unusual” nature of the case. 34 The trial judge relied on the fact that the
Copyright Act lists, 35 and case law recognizes, 36 annotations as works entitled
to copyright protection. Furthermore, the judge’s opinion noted that “the
United States Copyright Office’s own treatise expressly recognizes the
protectability of annotations.” 37
After losing in federal district court, Public.Resource.Org found a
more favorable result on appeal to the Eleventh Circuit. Writing for a
unanimous court, Judge Marcus held that:
[T]he annotations in the OCGA are sufficiently law-like so
as to be properly regarded as a sovereign work . . . . For
https://thefederalist.com/2019/11/06/supreme-court-should-stop-georgia-from-chargingcitizens-404-per-year-to-read-their-own-laws/ [https://perma.cc/AV86-4AUY]; Josephine
Wolff, Supreme Court Says State Laws Aren’t Copyrightable, SLATE (Apr. 29, 2020, 3:41
PM), https://slate.com/technology/2020/04/georgia-state-law-copyright-lexis-nexis-supremecourt.html [https://perma.cc/Q2QY-D5VP].
The Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 512, established a “notice-andtakedown system [which] allows rightsholders to send a notification to [an] online service
provider regarding infringing material that appears on the service provider’s system.” Section
29

512 of Title 17: Resources on Online Service Provider Safe Harbors and Notice-andTakedown
System,
U.S.
COPYRIGHT
OFF.,
https://www.copyright.gov/512/

[https://perma.cc/KW8R-AZCB].
Code Revision Comm’n, 244 F. Supp. 3d at 1354.
Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, ELEC. PRIV. INFO. CTR., https://epic.org/amicus/publicaccess/publicresourceorg/ [https://perma.cc/XHQ2-WCB4].
Code Revision Comm’n, 244 F. Supp. 3d at 1354.
Amended Complaint for Injunctive Relief at 12, Code Revision Comm’n v.
Public.Resource.Org, Inc., 244 F. Supp. 3d 1350 (N.D.Ga. 2017) (No. 1:15-CV-02594MHC 2015), 2015 WL 10008314; see also Adam Liptak, Accused of ‘Terrorism’ for Putting
Legal
Materials
Online,
N.Y.
TIMES
(May
13,
2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/13/us/politics/georgia-official-code-copyright.html
[https://perma.cc/Q64E-694F].
Code Revision Comm’n, 244 F. Supp. 3d at 1356 (“[M]ost official codes are not annotated
and most annotated codes are not official.”).
17 U.S.C. § 101.
See, e.g., Lawrence v. Dana, 15 F. Cas. 26 (C.C.D. Mass. 1869); W.H. Anderson Co. v.
Baldwin Law Pub. Co., 27 F.2d 82 (6th Cir. 1928).
Code Revision Comm’n, 244 F. Supp. 3d at 1356 (citing U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF.,
COMPENDIUM OF U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE PRACTICES §§ 313.6(C)(2), 717.1 (3d ed. 2014)).
30
31

32
33

34

35
36

37
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purposes of the Copyright Act, this means that the People
are the constructive authors of those official legal
promulgations of government that represent an exercise of
sovereign authority. And because they are the authors, the
People are the owners of these works, meaning that the
works are intrinsically public domain material and,
therefore, uncopyrightable. 38
Reasoning that the “ultimate inquiry is whether a work is authored
by the People,” the court relied on three “critical markers,” namely
“the identity of the public officials who created the work,
the authoritativeness of the work, and the process by which the work was
created.” 39
Georgia, on behalf of the Commission, petitioned the Supreme
Court for a writ of certiorari. 40 It was supported by the United States 41 and
thirteen states (plus the District of Columbia). 42 Unusually,
Public.Resource.Org “acquiesced” in Georgia’s writ, stating that “because it
is frequently sued [it] needs a clear rule governing when and to what extent
it can post official codes adopted by state legislatures.” 43

B.

U.S. Supreme Court’s Decision

Writing for an ideologically diverse majority, Chief Justice Roberts
(joined by Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh) upheld the
Eleventh Circuit’s ruling, “though for reasons distinct from those relied on
by the Court of Appeals.” 44 The Court rejected the “three markers” test
employed by the circuit court, instead finding that “careful examination of
our government edicts precedents reveals a straightforward rule based on
Code Revision Comm’n for Gen. Assembly of Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, Inc., 906
F.3d 1229, 1232–33 (11th Cir. 2018).
Id. at 1232 (emphasis omitted).
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, Inc., 140 S. Ct. 1498
(2020) (No. 18-1150).
See Amicus Brief for U.S. Supporting Petitioner, supra note 25 at 14, “[j]ust as an official
court reporter is the ‘author’ of annotations he prepares to accompany judicial opinions, so
too is [Georgia’s Code Revision Commission] the ‘author’ of statutory annotations that the
entity either prepares or has prepared for it as a work made for hire,” which entitles the
Commission to copyright protections of the annotations. Id.
Brief for the States of Arkansas, et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 1, Georgia
v. Public.Resource.Org, Inc., 140 S. Ct. 1498 (2020) (No. 18-1150), 2019 WL 4235530
[hereinafter Amicus Brief for Arkansas, et al.] (“By invalidating [Georgia’s] copyrights, the
Eleventh Circuit's interpretation of copyright law . . . would threaten the continued
production of official annotated state codes.”).
Brief of Respondent at *15, Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, Inc., 140 S. Ct. 1498 (2020)
(No. 18-1150), 2019 WL 5188978.
Public.Resource.Org, 140 S. Ct. at 1506.
38

39
40

41

42

43

44
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the identity of the author.” 45 As a result, the majority expanded the scope of
the government edicts doctrine, holding that “copyright does not vest in
works that are (1) created by judges and legislators (2) in the course of their
judicial and legislative duties.” 46 A review of the facts led the Court to
conclude that the Commission is an arm of the state legislature. 47 Satisfied
that the OCGA is an original work of authorship of the Commission acting
within the course and scope of the legislature’s official duties, the majority
therefore concluded that “Georgia’s annotations are not copyrightable.” 48
In separate dissenting opinions, Justice Thomas and Justice
Ginsburg argued that Georgia had a copyright interest in its annotated code,
albeit for reasons as distinct as those put forward by the majority and Court
of Appeals for why Georgia did not have a copyright interest. 49 Writing on
behalf of Justice Alito and Justice Breyer, 50 Justice Thomas took issue with
the majority’s “unwillingness to examine the root of a precedent” 51 and
charged the Roberts opinion with “textual deficiencies.” 52 In particular,
Justice Thomas found no basis for wholesale exclusion of copyright
protections for legislative works based solely on the construction of
“authorship.” 53 In essence, he would have upheld the annotations authored
by LexisNexis in the same way the Court upheld a reporter’s copyright claim
in Callaghan. 54 He also rejected the majority’s public policy argument that
upholding Georgia’s copyright claim would result in an “economy class”
version of the unannotated code online and a separate annotated code
available at a price to “first class” readers. 55 Instead, Justice Thomas posited
that “[t]he inability to access the OCGA merely deprives a researcher of one

45
46
47

Id.
Id. at 1508.
Id. at 1504–05. Facts that the majority found persuasive in its opinion include: (1) the

legislature established the Commission; (2) the majority of the Commission’s members are
legislators; (3) the Commission is funded through appropriations provided for the legislative
branch; (4) the Commission is staffed by the Office of Legislative Counsel; (5) the
Commission is constitutionally within the sphere of the legislature’s authority; and (6) the
Commission’s proposed statutory text and annotations are submitted annually to the
legislature for approval. Id.
Id. at 1508.
Id. at 1518, 1523 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (Ginsberg, J., dissenting).
Justice Breyer joined the dissent authored by Justice Thomas for all but Part II–A and
footnote 6. Id. at 1513.
Id. at 1515 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1520 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
See id. at 1519–20 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1517–18 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“Conclud[ing] that, as with the privately created
annotations in Callaghan, Georgia’s statutory annotations at issue in this case are
copyrightable.”).
Id. at 1512.
48
49
50

51
52
53
54

55
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specific tool, not to the underlying factual or legal information summarized
in that tool.” 56
Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justice Breyer, wrote a separate
dissenting opinion essentially endorsing the majority’s expansion of the
government edicts doctrine to encompass works that are created by
legislators in the course of their legislative duties. 57 Nonetheless, the
dissenting Justices would have held Georgia’s copyright claim valid based
on their argument that the OCGA was not authored in the course of the
General Assembly’s legislative duties. 58 To elucidate this point, the Justices
noted that (1) the annotations are created post-enactment of the statutes
passed by the legislature, (2) the “annotations are descriptive rather than
prescriptive,” and (3) the annotations “aim to inform the citizenry at large .
. . [as opposed to] those seated in legislative chambers.” 59
For Supreme Court watchers, the Public.Resource.Org decision is
noteworthy because of the unique judicial groupings that comprised both
the majority and dissenting opinions. Not only did the majority make up a
divergent cross-section of justices appointed by Presidents George W. Bush,
Obama, and Trump, but the pairing of Justice Ginsburg and Justice Breyer
in a joint dissent was perhaps just as surprising. Though both were
considered “liberal” members of the Court, Justice Ginsburg and Justice
Breyer repeatedly found themselves on opposite sides of copyright cases
throughout their overlapping careers on the Court. 60 Justice Ginsburg was
described as “the high court’s most fervently pro-copyright voice” who
“carried the big pen” on numerous copyright cases. 61 Justice Breyer, on the
other hand, has a long history of copyright skepticism, even preceding his

56
57
58
59

Id. at 1517–18 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1522–23 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1523 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (distinguishing codified statutes passed by the legislature from

other works passed by a legislature, such as a guide to the state capitol commissioned by the
Assembly of Georgia).
Ryan Davis, Ginsburg Remembered as Steadfast Pro-Copyright Voice, LAW 360 (Sept. 21,
2020, 11:26 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1312244/ginsburg-remembered-assteadfast-pro-copyright-voice [https://perma.cc/J7E7-HBLN] (“While the public generally
views the Supreme Court through a polarized and partisan lens, intellectual property cases
tend not to break along those lines.”). Justice Ginsburg’s “most frequent sparring partner on
copyright issues was Justice Stephen Breyer, with whom she was ideologically aligned on
most other major issues but who takes a more skeptical view of copyrights and intellectual
property.” Id.
Eriq Gardener, A Supreme Court Without RBG May Impact Hollywood’s Grip on
Intellectual
Property,
BILLBOARD
(Sept.
21,
2020),
https://www.billboard.com/articles/news/9452775/supreme-court-without-rbg-impacthollywood-intellectual-property [https://perma.cc/GY5E-4KNH].
60

61
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time on the bench. 62 It is therefore remarkable that these two Justices agreed
with the majority on the applicable rule, disagreed with the majority on the
application of the rule to the facts of the case before the Court, and agreed
with one another that copyright protection should have been extended to
the OCGA. 63
C.

Understanding the Stakeholders’ Interests

For some, reading the majority and dissenting opinions of this case
will leave them asking, “what is the point?” Legislative annotations and the
organization of information about state statutes might strike even the most
eager law student as a bit technical or abstruse. Therefore, before turning to
an analysis of the Public.Resource.Org decision and the copyrightability of
the law, it is important to first understand the various stakeholders and their
interests in the Court’s decision. The following overview of
Public.Resource.Org and select amici curiae who filed briefs in support of
Public.Resource.Org and Georgia frames the consequences of this case and
other cases involving related questions of copyright protection for law-like
works.

1.

What is Public.Resource.Org?

Public.Resource.Org is the brainchild of Carl Malamud, the
organization’s only staffer, who has been at the forefront of several efforts
to bring public records into the public domain. 64 In the early 1990s,
Malamud copied and compiled Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) data about publicly traded companies, including annual reports,
proxy statements and other documents and made them available on the
internet for free. 65 He then coaxed the SEC into eventually running the
See Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of Copyright in Books,
Photocopies, and Computer Programs, 84 HARV. L. REV. 281, 284 (1970) (“[T]he evidence
62

now available suggests that, although we should hesitate to abolish copyright protection, we
should equally hesitate to extend or strengthen it.”). In a speech delivered more than forty
years after the publication of his article challenging copyright expansionism, Justice Breyer
explained that he had endeavored to examine the application of the Coase Theorem to the
field of copyright, which was the idea “that if there were no costs of distributing property
rights, and no costs of engaging in transactions with regard to those property rights, then the
initial distribution of rights would not matter, because no matter what that was, people would
exchange rights to get what they wanted.” Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright:
A Look Back Across Four Decades, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1635, 1636–37 (2011).
See Public.Resource.Org, Inc., 140 S. Ct. at 1523 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting).
Clint Hendler, Carl Malamud, Public Printer, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV. (Mar. 13, 2009),
https://archives.cjr.org/campaign_desk/carl_malamud_public_printer.php
[https://perma.cc/FK5T-6S8D].
63
64

65

Id.
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database, 66 now known as EDGAR. 67 Malamud’s work was “praised by the
White House and public interest groups as a model of public dissemination
of government data in the computer age.” 68 He has been involved with
similar efforts regarding the federal patents database, the opinions of the
U.S. Courts of Appeals, 69 and congressional hearings. 70
As Malamud explained in an interview, his “goal has always been
policy change.” 71 In 2009, Malamud attempted to shape policy from inside
the government when he launched a celebrated, albeit unsuccessful,
campaign to run the U.S. Government Printing Office (GPO). 72 If
nominated and confirmed, Malamud pledged to “radically change how [the
GPO] present[s] information on the Internet,” by “enshrining principles of
bulk data distribution into legislation.” 73
Following his failed bid for Public Printer, Malamud continued his
decades-long efforts to make the law and law-like information available for
free access online. In addition to the Georgia state code, Malamud copied
An Internet Access to S.E.C. Filings to End Oct. 1, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 12, 1995),
https://www.nytimes.com/1995/08/12/business/an-internet-access-to-sec-filings-to-end-oct1.html [https://perma.cc/G2RZ-8NNF]. Malamud told consumers of the data to contact the
SEC if they wanted to continue to have access and argued that the Paperwork Reduction Act
required agencies with public records stored electronically to provide “timely and equitable
access” in an “efficient, effective and economical manner.” Id. After numerous requests from
users of the data, the SEC agreed to operate the database. Id. This outcome represents a
model that Malamud has pushed repeatedly through his work: challenging government to
do the work of generating and supporting the continued provision of public materials rather
than relying on the private sector. Id.
About EDGAR, U.S. SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N, https://www.sec.gov/edgar/about
[https://perma.cc/XH8A-JVNC]. The Electronic Data Gathering, Analysis, and Retrieval
(EDGAR) system “benefits investors, corporations, and the U.S. economy overall by
increasing the efficiency, transparency, and fairness of the securities markets. Id. The system
processes about 3,000 filings per day, serves up 3,000 terabytes of data to the public annually,
and accommodates 40,000 new filers per year on average.” Id.
Same-Day Internet Access to S.E.C. Filings, N.Y. TIMES (May 1, 1995),
https://www.nytimes.com/1995/05/01/business/same-day-internet-access-to-sec-filings.html
[https://perma.cc/R52C-Z5MA] (noting before EDGAR, “[a] single document [could] cost
more than $50 if acquired through private companies that sell government data to the
public.”).
Levy, supra note 19.
James Fallows, Another Win for Carl Malamud (or: News You Won’t See in the May 2007
Issue
of
the
Atlantic),
THE
ATLANTIC
(Mar.
9,
2007),
https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2007/03/another-win-for-carl-malamud-ornews-you-won-apos-t-see-in-the-may-2007-issue-of-the-atlantic/7543 [https://perma.cc/JA24HEWF].
Hendler, supra note 64.
Tim Jones, Yes We Scan: Carl Malamud for Public Printer, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND.
(Mar. 2, 2009) https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2009/03/yes-we-scan [https://perma.cc/GV6NFNSJ].
Prepared
Statement
by
Carl
Malamud,
YES
WE
SCAN,
https://yeswescan.org/index.gpo.html [https://perma.cc/PG8U-FFTP].
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and redistributed codes from Arkansas, Colorado, Idaho, and Mississippi,
as well as various municipal ordinances. 74 Unlike its dispute with Georgia,
no formal legal action was taken against the organization by other
governments. 75
Separately, Public.Resource.Org became embroiled in a protracted
legal battle with standards developing organizations (SDOs) over
Public.Resource.Org’s copying and redistribution of standards developed
by private SDOs, which were later incorporated by reference into law. 76 In
testimony before the House Judiciary Committee, Malamud—sitting next to
a representative of the American National Standards Institute 77—implored
Congress to amend the Copyright Act to declare that “[e]dicts of
government, such as judicial opinions, administrative rulings, legislative
enactments, public ordinances, and similar official legal documents are not
copyrightable for reasons of public policy.” 78 Malamud defined edicts of
government as “the rules of general applicability by which we choose to
govern ourselves as a society.” 79

2.

Stakeholders that Supported Public.Resource.Org

Amici curiae who filed briefs in favor of Public.Resource.Org can
be generally categorized as (1) disruptive legal research platforms, (2) public
interest and open technology organizations, and (3) academics. The first two
categories are addressed here.
The legal technology industry has seen profound growth in a short
amount of time. In 2014, over thirty percent of legal tech platforms that
participated in the American Bar Association’s Techshow were “first
timers” best described as legal startups. 80 From 2016 through 2018, the
industry saw a whopping 713 percent growth in investment, primarily driven

An Edicts of Government Amendment: Hearings on Review of U.S. Copyright Law Before
the Subcomm. on Cts., Intell. Prop. & the Internet of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th
Cong. 4 (2014) [hereinafter Hearings on Review of U.S. Copyright Law] (statement of Carl
74

Malamud, Public.Resource.Org).

75
76

Id.
See Freeing the Law with Public.Resource.Org, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND.,

https://www.eff.org/cases/publicresource-freeingthelaw [https://perma.cc/JSW5-SGZC].
About ANSI, AM. NAT’L STANDARDS INST., https://ansi.org/about/introduction
[https://perma.cc/G3SG-3SUN]. “The American Standard Institute (ANSI) is a private, nonprofit organization that administers and coordinates the U.S. voluntary standards and
conformity assessments system.” Id. Its membership includes SDOs. Id.
Hearings on Review of U.S. Copyright Law, supra note 74 at 15; see also Banks v.
Manchester, 128 U.S. 244, 253 (1888) (“The question is one of public policy.”).
Hearings on Review of U.S. Copyright Law, supra note 74 at 2.
Jobst Elster, Start Me Up . . . I’ll Never Stop, LEGAL IT TODAY (June 10, 2015).
77

78

79
80
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by electronic discovery and legal research needs. 81 While the term “legal
tech” is broad and extends well beyond research platforms, the growth in
the market threatens the duopoly (real or perceived) that Westlaw and
LexisNexis (referred collectively by the portmanteau “Wexis”) 82 have long
enjoyed. 83
Casetext, Docket Alarm, Fastcase, Free Law Project, Internet
Archive, Judicata, Justia, and UniCourt are among the disruptive legal tech
platforms that challenge the Wexis duopoly. In their amicus brief to the
Court, these “next-generation legal research and analytics platforms and
databases” argued that “an overbroad application of copyright to core legal
materials will harm innovation, competition, and the public interest.” 84
These organizations did not offer a specific test or rule for the Court to
consider but insisted that it must include the “legal core”—that is, “legal
information that has been created, adopted, or imbued with the authority,
imprimatur, or sanction of the state.” 85 In their view, this necessarily requires
unimpeded public “access to a wider set of information than just statutes
and judicial opinions.” 86 Further, these organizations rejected petitioner’s
argument that only legal materials carrying the binding force of law can be
covered by the government edicts doctrine because “some legal information
carries sufficient authority or involvement of the state that it becomes just as
essential as statutes and opinions in the actual operation of the law and
governmental institutions.” 87
Public interest and open technology organizations shared the legal
technology industry’s concern that the Court might determine that the
OCGA falls outside of the scope of the government edicts doctrine but
Valentin Pivavorav, 713% Growth: Legal Tech Set an Investment Record in 2018, FORBES
(Jan.
15,
2019),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/valentinpivovarov/2019/01/15/legaltechinvestment2018/?sh=3
d1ddc737c2b [https://perma.cc/W3LR-PHPW]. Investment spiked from $224 million to
over $1.6 billion in two years. Id.
See Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. TheLaw.Net Corp., 269 F. Supp. 2d 942, 945 (S.D. Ohio 2003)
(denying motion to dismiss West’s trademark dilution claim over reference to the “Wexis
duopoly” on defendant’s website).
LAC GRP., LexisNexis Versus Westlaw Revisited (Feb. 22, 2018), https://lacgroup.com/blog/lexisnexis-versus-westlaw-revisited/
[https://perma.cc/22DR-XURH]
(“While Westlaw and Lexis continue to be at the top, their grip on market dominance has
continued to loosen with the entrance of technology startups that are both well-funded and
agile.”).
Brief of Amici Curiae Next-Generation Legal Rsch. Platforms and Databases in Support
of Respondent, Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, Inc., 140 S. Ct. 1498 (2020) (No. 18-1150),
2019 WL 5305481, at *1 [hereinafter Amicus Brief for Next-Generation and Databases]
(emphasis added).
Id. at *4.
81

82

83

84

85
86
87

Id.
Id. at *5.
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lacked consensus over whether the OCGA was binding law. For example,
the Internet Association—representing dozens of companies that make open
government data available for public use—urged the Court not to limit the
doctrine to government documents that impose binding legal obligations. 88
This may suggest that the Internet Association lacked confidence that
Georgia’s annotated code carries the full force of law. On the other hand,
the Center for Democracy and Technology (CDT) and the Cato Institute
centered their amicus brief arguments on the premise that all people must
have access to the laws that bind them, indicating that they may not have
thought the binding effect of the OCGA was in question. 89
Despite the discrepancy over the binding effect of the OCGA, this
category of amici supporting Public.Resource.Org agreed that the OCGA
is, at a minimum, authoritative. 90 Additionally, they took umbrage with the
commercialization of law and law-like materials online. In their amicus
brief, Cato and CDT—an organization which advocates for an open,
decentralized internet—argued that individual privacy and autonomy is
harmed when authoritative government documents are only accessible in
exchange for sensitive data, which LexisNexis collects from users when they
visit the company’s website to view the OCGA. 91 Similarly, the Internet
Association noted that “[t]his places the public’s access to the only website
that hosts the official version of the law at the mercy of business and
technical choices made by a contractor like Lexis for its own commercial
reasons.” 92
Collectively, the stakeholders that filed briefs in support of
Public.Resource.Org saw the case as a fundamental issue of democracy and
endeavored to push the bounds of the ;lkj government edicts doctrine to
cover any authoritative government document, regardless of its legal binding
effect. Underneath the legal arguments, the disruptive legal research
platforms were also motivated by an interest in breaking the backbone of a
commercial arrangement between states and major incumbent legal
databases, like LexisNexis, which impedes their ability to penetrate the
market and make like material available on their own platforms for free.

Brief of Amicus Curiae Internet Ass’n Supporting Respondent, Georgia v.
Public.Resource.Org, Inc., 140 S. Ct. 1498 (2020) (No. 18-1150), 2019 WL 5290509, at *11
[hereinafter Amicus Brief of Internet Ass’n] (arguing that this would be an unmanageable
rule because “[n]ot all sources of legal authority set forth binding legal obligations”).
Brief of the Ctr. for Democracy and Tech. and Cato Inst. As Amici Curiae in Support of
Respondent, Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, Inc., 140 S. Ct. 1498 (2020) (No. 18-1150),
2019 WL 5290510, at *2 [hereinafter Amicus Brief of CDT and Cato Inst.].
Id. at *3; Amicus Brief of Internet Ass’n, supra note 88, at *1–3.
Amicus Brief of CDT and Cato Inst., supra note 89, at *20.
Amicus Brief of Internet Ass’n, supra note 88, at *6–7.
88

89

90
91
92
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Stakeholders that Supported Georgia

Georgia’s position was supported in amicus briefs filed by (1) the
U.S. Copyright Office (on behalf of the United States), (2) states with work
made for hire codification schemes similar to Georgia’s, (3) large,
incumbent legal research companies, and (4) SDOs. The positions of the
states and legal research companies are addressed in this Section, while the
positions of the government and SDOs are dealt with later in this Paper.
The thirteen states, 93 and the District of Columbia, that filed an
amicus brief in favor of Georgia had, at one time or another, all claimed a
copyright in their annotated codes. 94 Their brief argued that the Eleventh
Circuit’s ruling would upend the work made for hire arrangements that they
relied on to contract with third-party annotators who recouped costs by
selling the code. 95 If their annotated codes did not enjoy copyright
protection, then the annotators would charge states for producing the codes
or halt production altogether. 96 The effect of this would be to increase the
costs on lawyers, who rely on annotated codes to begin their legal research. 97
Aside from the functionalist reasoning relied on by the states, State
and D.C. amici also took the position that “[a]nnotations are not themselves
the law, nor authoritative guidance on it.” 98 This argument—at least with
respect to the claim that the annotations do not provide authoritative
guidance—is hard to square with the facts of Public.Resource.Org, where the
Commission approved the annotations, 99 and also with amici’s own
argument that the annotations are “a starting point” that lawyers use to
understand state law. 100 Finally, the State and D.C. amici emphasized that
the case law relied on by the Eleventh Circuit interpreted a practically
ancient version of federal copyright statute and questioned whether it is still
applicable under current law. 101 For example, the State and D.C. amici noted
that the Copyright Act expressly excludes works authored by the United
States Government from copyright protection, 102 but it contains no similar
exclusion for state-authored works. 103
Arkansas, Alabama, Alaska, Idaho, Kansas, Mississippi, Nebraska, South Carolina, South
Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, and Virginia. See Amicus Brief for Arkansas, et al.,
supra note 42, at *1.
93

94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101

Id.
Id.
Id. at *3.
Id.
Id.
See Brief of Respondent, supra note 43, at *52.
Amicus Brief for Arkansas, et al., supra note 42, at *3.
See id. at *4. (“[T]he theory behind [the government edicts doctrine] under existing

copyright law . . . is unclear.”).
Id.
Id. at *7–8.
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103
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The states’ position was reinforced by LexisNexis and the
publishing amicus Matthew Bender & Co., Inc., which annotated the
OCGA. The annotator stressed “the painstaking, creative efforts that [it]
performed to create this work of authorship” and noted that it “follows a
similar, time-consuming process to create annotations for many other
States.” 104 Furthermore, Matthew Bender & Co. contended that
Public.Resource.Org’s actions not only infringed on Georgia’s valid
copyright but that a ruling in the organization’s favor would “destroy the
economic incentive for creating this deeply valuable work, while imposing
needless costs on the public.” 105 Citing case law, Matthew Bender & Co.
urged the Court to consider the risks that such an outcome would have on
“‘[t]he economic philosophy behind’ the Copyright Clause” of the
Constitution. 106
Having established its interest in the case and articulated the harm
that upholding the Eleventh Circuit’s ruling would have on private
development of annotated codes, the legal research giant attacked the
argument that the annotations were binding. First, Matthew Bender & Co.
cited Georgia’s own code and state supreme court decisions, which “make
clear that the Annotations have no ‘official weight[.]’” 107 Second, to
underscore this point, Matthew Bender & Co. provided the following
sample annotation, from the 2014 edition of the Annotations, for Cho
Carwash Prop., LLC v. Everett, 755 S.E.2d 823 (Ga. 2014), and section 349-260 of OCGA:
Award of workers’ compensation benefits was upheld
because there was some evidence to support the
administrative law judge’s calculation of the claimant’s
average weekly wage under [OCGA] § 34-9-260(3) based
on the claimant’s testimony that the claimant was supposed
to work from the car wash’s opening until its close. 108
As explained by Matthew Bender & Co., “[n]o part of the part of the above
Annotation is Statutory Text or a judicial opinion, and it carries no force of
law.” 109 Third, Matthew Bender & Co. cited the plain text of Copyright Act
itself, which protects annotations of “derivative work[s],” 110 and provided
nearly twenty examples of the U.S. Copyright Office registering state-owned
Brief for Matthew Bender & Co., Inc. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners, Georgia
v. Public.Resource.Org, Inc., 140 S. Ct. 1498 (2020) (No. 18-1150), 2019 WL 4235527, at
*1 [hereinafter Amicus Brief for Bender & Co.].
Id. at *2.
Id. at *3 (quoting Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954)).
Id. at *2 (quoting Harrison Co. v. Code Revision Comm’n, 260 S.E.2d 30, 35 (Ga. 1979)).
Id. at *6 (citations omitted).
104

105
106
107
108
109
110

Id.
Id. at *14 (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 101, 103(a)).
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annotations. 111 Finally, it characterized the Eleventh Circuit’s analysis of the
authoritativeness of the OCGA as an “unfocused inquiry, divorced from any
holding or reasoning in Wheaton, Callaghan, and Banks or the
Copyright Act’s text.” 112
In effect, the states and incumbent legal research community
regarded the Eleventh Circuit’s ruling as a departure from settled case law,
the copyright statute, and the Copyright Office’s own longstanding practice.
Both stressed the practical effects of upholding the circuit court’s decision
on the publishing model that states and annotators had enjoyed. While they
also agreed that the OCGA was not binding, a small fissure emerged over
the authoritativeness of the annotations, with the states taking the position
that the OCGA was not authoritative at all and LexisNexis arguing that
authoritativeness was irrelevant to the inquiry altogether.
III.

ANALYSIS

The Public.Resource.Org Court faced the fundamental challenge
of balancing the weight of its copyright precedents and the Copyright Act
itself against the commercialization of legal materials 113 and the principle of
rule of law. 114 Despite compelling facts and law on Georgia’s side (not to
mention the two copyright heavyweights 115 on the bench), the judicial interest
in rule of law was too great to be confined by the Court’s prior decisions
which, by themselves, favor a finding that the OCGA is copyrightable. 116
This Section considers why the Court chose to rely on the identity
of the author to determine whether a particular work is an edict of
government rather than the content of the work. Next, this Section
addresses open questions left by the decision concerning what materials can
be said to constitute law. Finally, this Section explores the (possibly
unintended) impact of this case on privately authored works incorporated
by reference 117 into law.
111
112
113

Id. at *15–16.
Id. at *23–24.
See Street & Hansen, supra note 10, at 206 (“[P]ublishers now use powerful legal tools to

control who has access to the text of the law, how much they must pay, and under what
terms.”).
See Overview - Rule of Law, U.S. COURTS, https://www.uscourts.gov/educationalresources/educational-activities/overview-rule-law [https://perma.cc/QB8Q-J6D7].
See supra notes 60–63 (discussing Justices Ginsburg and Breyer).
See Ed Krayewski, Official Law of Georgia is Copyrighted, and the State Enforces that
Copyright, REASON (Mar. 31, 2017), https://reason.com/2017/03/31/official-law-of-georgiais-copyrighted-a/ [https://perma.cc/54L9-LFYH].
“[I]ncorporation by reference is a term of art for the practice of codifying material
published elsewhere by simply referring to it in the text of a regulation.” Emily S. Bremmer,
Incorporation by Reference in an Open-Government Age, 36 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 131,
133 (2013).
114

115
116

117
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A. Copyright Exclusions Based on Author
While the long-term effect of the Public.Resource.Org ruling on
commercial legal materials and state-sanctioned annotations is unclear, an
immediate impact of the decision is the creation of an anomaly in modern
copyright law in which certain works are ineligible for protection based on
the judge-made legal fiction of constructive authorship. 118 The Court’s focus
in Public.Resource.Org on the identity of the author is consistent with the
nineteenth-century case law that makes up the government edicts doctrine
as applied to the nation’s eighteenth-century copyright statute. 119 Yet, such
focus reflects a departure from today’s code.
The courts are generally wary of looking beyond the Copyright Act
in assessing whether a particular work is entitled to protection. In Sony
Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., the Court characterized “[t]he
judiciary’s reluctance to expand the protections afforded by the copyright
without explicit legislative guidance” as “a recurring theme” in its copyright
jurisprudence. 120 Citing Wheaton, the Court in Sony Corp. went so far as to
assert that “the protection given to copyrights is wholly statutory.” 121
The first federal Congress enacted the Copyright Act of 1790 to
protect the “author or authors” of certain works. 122 Under its modern
statutory construct, however, the Copyright Act of 1976 extends copyright
protection to “original works of authorship.” 123 Thus, the original emphasis
of copyright protection in the author now attaches instead to the author’s
original works. With the sole exception of works authored by the U.S.
Government, nowhere in the Copyright Act is a work of authorship denied
copyright protection based on identity of the human author of the work. 124
Modern law categorically precludes any work of the U.S.
Government from copyright protection. 125 This limitation generally extends

See Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, Inc., 140 S. Ct. 1498 (2020).
See id.
Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 431 (1984) (citing Teleprompter
Corp. v. CBS, 415 U.S. 394 (1974); Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists, 392 U.S. 390
(1968); White-Smith Music Publ’g Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1 (1908); Williams &
Wilkins v. United States, 420 U.S. 376 (1975)).
Sony Corp., 464 U.S. at 431. (citing Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. 591, 661–62 (1834)).
118
119
120

121

Copyright Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, § 1, 1 Stat. 124 (repealed 1831).
17 U.S.C. § 102(a).
As explained by the U.S. Copyright Office, “the Office will refuse to register a claim if it
determines that a human being did not create the work.” U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF.,
COMPENDIUM OF U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF. PRACS. § 306 (3d ed. 2017) (emphasis added).
17 U.S.C. § 105. This section of the 1976 Act carries forward a substantially similar
prohibition in section 7 of the Copyright Act of 1909, which provided that “[n]o copyright
shall subsist . . . in any publication of the United States Government . . . .”An Act to Amend
and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright, 60th Cong., 2d Sess. (as passed by Congress
122
123
124

125
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to works made for hire. 126 As explained in the House Report accompanying
the 1976 rewrite of the Copyright Act, “[S]ection 105 is intended to place
all works of the United States Government, published or unpublished, in
the public domain.” 127 According to the U.S. Copyright Office, this “includes
legislation enacted by Congress, decisions issued by the federal judiciary,
regulations issued by a federal agency, or any other work prepared by an
officer or employee of the U.S. federal government while acting within the
course of his or her official duties.” 128 Furthermore, “[a]s a matter of
longstanding public policy, the U.S. Copyright Office will not register a
government edict that has been issued by any state, local, or territorial
government, including legislative enactments, judicial decisions,
administrative rulings, public ordinances, or similar types of official legal
materials.” 129
While the courts generally refrain from increasing the scope of
copyright protection to subject matters without a statutory basis, one cannot
help but notice that there is no language in the Copyright Act to limit
protection for works authored by state legislators like there is for U.S.
Government-authored works. Section 105 of the Copyright Act essentially
codifies Wheaton but does not sweep in state edicts governed by Banks.
Looked at through general principles of statutory interpretation,
congressional silence on the copyrightability of works authored by the states
draws a “negative inference: expressio unius est exclusio alterius (the
inclusion of one is the exclusion of others).” 130 When presented with the
opportunity to legislate on the copyrightability of law generally, Congress
surgically addressed federally authored works and chose to go no further. 131
To reason otherwise would amount to “enlargement” of the statute rather
than “construction” of it, 132 which Sony Corp. eschews. That the Copyright
Mar. 9, 1909), https://www.copyright.gov/history/1909act.pdf [https://perma.cc/79RTB446].
H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 58 (1976).
Id. at 59.
U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF., supra note 124, § 306.
Id. § 313.6(C)(2). A policy innovation of the Copyright Act of 1976 is that registration of a
copyright is not a prerequisite of protection. See 17 U.S.C. § 408. Thus, before the
Public.Resource.Org ruling, the policy of the Copyright Office not to register government
edicts issued by state, local, and territorial governments was not necessarily determinative of
whether such works were protected by copyright law.
LARRY M. EIG, CONG. RES. SERV., STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: GEN. PRINCIPLES AND
RECENT TRENDS 18 (2014).
See generally Preemption of a State Law Claim by Federal Copyright Act, 76 A.L.R.6TH
289 (2012).
Iselin v. United States, 270 U.S. 245, 251 (1926); see also Lamie v. United States Tr., 540
U.S. 526, 538 (2004) (“[T]here is a basic difference between filling a gap left by Congress’
silence and rewriting rules that Congress has affirmatively and specifically enacted.”) (citing
Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham, 98 S. Ct. 210 (1978)).
126
127
128
129

130

131

132
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Office refuses to register state government edicts supports this point, since
its refusal was based on policy—not on law.
In its brief for the Court, Public.Resource.Org claimed that the
OCGA is simply not a work of authorship because it is a government edict. 133
Presented with this argument by one of the parties, the Court could have
performed an analysis of the annotations to determine whether they are
“original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression.” 134
If the Court had applied that analysis, the Court would have likely found
that the annotations fall into the category of literary works and then
proceeded to consider whether the OCGA is sufficiently original. 135 A
finding of originality would then lead the Court to consider whether the
original work is nevertheless covered by an exception in the statute, such as
the general prohibition on extending copyright protection “to any idea,
procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or
discovery.” 136 Instead, the Court declined to even consider whether the
OCGA is a work of authorship, likely because the annotations satisfy the
prima facie elements required to be copyrightable. 137
The majority in Public.Resource.Org also elected not to evaluate
either the binding effect or the authoritativeness of the OCGA, despite
amici’s intense focus on those two prongs for purposes of analyzing the work
as a government edict. In fact, the Court expressly rejected this approach,
which was a factor employed by the Eleventh Circuit. 138
The Eleventh Circuit’s reasoning hews closely to the Robert’s
opinion insofar as it “rel[ied] on the identity of the public officials who
created the works” in question, however, the circuit court did not rely on
authorship alone in its analysis. 139 In this sense, the appellate court was
“guided by a consideration of those characteristics that are the hallmarks of
[copyright] law” and not just one element. 140 The significance of the
Brief of Respondent, supra note 43, at *2.
17 U.S.C. § 102(a).
The originality requirement is “the bedrock principle of copyright” and “the very premise
of copyright law.” Feist Publ’n, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 347 (1991)
(citation omitted). “To qualify for copyright protection, a work must be . . . independently
created by the author” and “possess[] at least some minimal degree of creativity.” Id. at 345.
17 U.S.C. § 102(b); see also U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF., CIRCULAR 33, WORKS NOT
PROTECTED BY COPYRIGHT (2017).
There are three distinct elements required to qualify as a copyrightable compilation: “(1)
the collection and assembly of pre-existing material, facts, or data; (2) the selection,
coordination, or arrangement of those materials; and (3) the creation, by virtue of the
particular selection, coordination, or arrangement, of an ‘original’ work of authorship.” Feist
Publ’n, 499 U.S. at 357.
Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, Inc., 140 S. Ct. 1498, 1506 (2020).
Code Revision Comm’n for Gen. Assembly of Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, Inc., 906
F.3d 1229, 1232 (11th Cir. 2018) (emphasis in original).
133
134
135

136

137

138
139

140

Id.
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departure between the Eleventh Circuit and the Supreme Court on this
point cannot be overstated. This is because the Eleventh Circuit’s approach
invites a broader and more thorough examination of whether a work of
authorship is “law,” which might leave the door open for other “law-like”
works to lose copyright protection. 141
All nine of the Justices agree with the fundamental principle that no
one owns the law. 142 The debate, then, was less about whether a state
government can own the law than whether the annotations in question were
government edicts. 143 The majority’s use of a blunt framework to determine
whether the annotations were covered by the government edicts doctrine—
by looking to the author, as opposed to the author’s work—is a pragmatic
exercise in judicial efficiency. The holding favors certainty and predictability
over the more nuanced analyses put forward by Justice Thomas and Justice
Ginsburg.
Yet
the
Court’s
reasoning
should
disappoint
Public.Resource.Org., the respondent, and many of the interested parties
who favored the Eleventh Circuit’s approach. This is because the decision
potentially leaves many law-like works that are privately authored and
arguably carry the same or greater weight than annotations out of reach from
the government edicts doctrine.

B.

What is Law?

By examining the author alone to determine whether a work is a
law, the majority in Public.Resource.Org sidestepped difficult questions at
the heart of the government edicts doctrine. Chief among them: what is
“law,” exactly?
At the federal level, a bill passed by Congress cannot become a law
without meeting the constitutional procedural requirements of
bicameralism and presentment to the president. 144 To determine whether
these requirements have been met, the Court considers, inter alia, whether
an action by the legislature is “essentially legislative in purpose and effect.” 145
It does so by analyzing if the action “had the purpose and effect of altering
the legal rights, duties and relations of persons.” 146 In Georgia, substantially
similar requirements exist, and revisions to the OCGA itself require

141
142

Id. at 1233.
Public.Resource.Org, Inc., 140 S. Ct. at 1507 (“The animating principle behind this rule

is that no one can own the law.”).
Id. at 1503.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7.
INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 952, 960 (1983) (holding the legislative veto
unconstitutional).
Id. at 952.
143
144
145

146
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bicameral support in the General Assembly before being presented to the
governor. 147
However, passage of a bill that is signed by the chief executive does
not end the inquiry. Those enacted bills are later scrutinized by judges and,
in some cases, held to be unconstitutional. 148 Thus, a measure codified into
positive law may have no force or effect if it has been struck down by the
courts even though it remains codified. Further, common law—the law
created by judges—is binding without the aid of a statute passed by a
legislature. Regulations promulgated by the executive branch, with or
without the explicit direction of a legislative body, may be appropriately
considered binding law. 149 Non-binding guidance issued by an executive
branch may even be factored into a person’s compliance with the law. 150
In Banks, the Court declared “the law, which, bind[s] every citizen,”
uncopyrightable. 151 Based on this, some supporters of Georgia’s position
understood that to mean only law with direct binding effect is covered by
government edicts doctrine. 152 On the other hand, supporters of
Public.Resource.Org generally stressed the authoritativeness of a
government document to determine whether it is a law. 153 Their claim is
supported by Callaghan, which denied “copyright in the opinions of the
judges, or in the work done by them in their official capacity as judges,” 154
suggesting that even dissenting opinions, which are by definition not binding
law, are nevertheless covered by the doctrine. Black’s Law Dictionary
satisfies either point of view, defining law as “[t]he regime that orders human
activities and relations through systematic application of . . . force” or, in the
alternative, “[t]he aggregate of legislation, judicial precedents, and accepted
legal principles; the body of authoritative grounds of judicial and
administrative action.” 155
As observed by Leslie A. Street and David R. Hansen, “[d]espite
what appears to be a clear rule against copyright protection over the law,
GA. CONST. art. III, § 5, para. XIII (“All bills and all resolutions which have been passed
by the General Assembly intended to have the effect of law shall become law if the Governor
approves or fails to veto the same . . . .”) (emphasis added); GA. CODE. ANN. § 1-1-1.
Cobb County v. Campbell, 350 S.E.2d 466, 467 (Ga. 1986).
Exec. Order No. 13891, 84 Fed. Reg. 55235 (Oct. 9, 2019) (“Departments and agencies
(agencies) in the executive branch adopt regulations that impose legally binding requirements
on the public even though, in our constitutional democracy, only Congress is vested with the
legislative power.”).
Id. (“[A]gencies have sometimes used [guidance] inappropriately in attempts to regulate
the public . . . [e]ven when accompanied by a disclaimer that it is non-binding.”).
Banks v. Manchester, 128 U.S. 244, 253 (1888).
See, e.g., Amicus Brief for Matthew Bender & Co., supra note 104, at 2.
See, e.g., Amicus Brief for Next-Generation and Databases, supra note 84, at 1.
Callaghan v. Meyers, 128 U.S. 617, 647 (1888) (emphasis added).
Law, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
147

148
149

150
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152
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154
155

998

MITCHELL HAMLINE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 47

publishers continue to assert copyright[s]” in such materials. 156 This
dichotomy exists because notions of what “law” is are not universally
accepted. 157 For example, although there is no argument that legislators and
judges make law, virtually any law student would point to the American Law
Institute’s (ALI) Restatement of Torts 158 and the Model Penal Code
(MPC) 159—which no state has adopted in its entirety—as “law.” This is
because these “law-like” materials are tested on the bar exam. 160 Moreover,
the Restatement is frequently adopted, verbatim, in judicial opinions 161 and
the MPC. Even when adopted in modified form by a state’s legislature, it is
used as a critical reference point to understand legislative intent and
statutory construction. 162 Notably, when these materials are referenced or
adopted in case law, the ALI retains a copyright interest in material related
to such work, such as those portions that are not expressly incorporated into
the text of a judicial opinion. 163 For example, comments and illustrations
used to give meaning to the Restatement retain their copyright protection
despite the fact that they could be critical to understanding the significance
of a particular word or phrase in the Restatement as adopted by a court.
However, because the ALI is not a legislator or a judge, it is not a judicial or
legislative author under the majority’s view of the government edicts
doctrine. This is in spite of the fact that the ALI’s works of authorship are,
at least by some accounts, the “raw materials” of the law, which are critical
to understanding its meaning, not unlike the annotations of Georgia’s
official code. 164
It may seem obvious that the government edicts doctrine should
only cover works authored by a government entity charged with making law.
156
157
158
159
160

Street & Hansen, supra note 10, at 222.
Id. at 210.
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS (AM. L. INST.) (2013).
See MODEL PENAL CODE (AM. L. INST.) (1962).
See AdaptiBar, What Law Should I Apply on the MBE? (July 2, 2019),

https://blog.adaptibar.com/what-law-apply-mbe/ [https://perma.cc/G5TZ-3ERY].
See, e.g., Thompson v. Kaczinski, 774 N.W.2d 829, 839 (Iowa 2009) (“[T]he
[Restatement] drafters’ clarification of scope of liability sound . . . and, accordingly, adopt
it.”).
See, e.g., People v. Goetz, 497 N.E.2d 41, 50 (N.Y. 1986) (“New York[s] [refusal to] follow
the Model Penal Code’s equation of a mistake as to the need to use deadly force” was the
determinative factor in construing the state’s penal code).
See, e.g., DEBORAH A. DEMOTT, Restatements and Non-State Codifications of Private
Law, in CODIFICATION IN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 75-90 (Wen-Yeu Wang ed., 2014)
(noting that ALI owns a copyright in the Restatement as part of its long-lived joint venture
with the West Publishing Company).
American University Washington College of Law, Program on Information Justice and
Intellectual Property, IP at the Supreme Court Series: Georgia v. Public.Resources.Org, Inc.,
YOUTUBE
(Dec.
2,
2019),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OcposI6qZE&feature=youtu.be [https://perma.cc/JC54-CY6Q] (quoting panelist Joseph C. Gratz).
161

162

163

164
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Yet that presupposes that everyone looks to the works of legislatures and
judges alone to know the law. This one-dimensional approach to knowing
the law bears little resemblance to reality. In fact, lawyers would commit
legal malpractice if they looked to a statute alone to understand its true
meaning. 165 Street and Hansen identify three critical attributes that
accompany “the law,” writing that “only an official, authentic and
authoritative source is accorded the full weight of ‘the law.’” 166 These three
elements overlap to a large extent with the three “markers” used by the
Eleventh Circuit to ascertain whether the OCGA was a government edict. 167
Neither approach relies exclusively on authorship to determine what is law.
In Public.Resource.Org, the Eleventh Circuit’s approach is a less
expedient but more practical way of uncovering what is “law,” which both
parties agreed cannot be copyrighted. 168 This is because it creates space for
the full gambit of law-like works not authored by legislators and judges to be
freed from internet paywalls and terms of services and opened to public
access so that every citizen may fulfill their duty to know the law. 169 This not
only accords with the needs and professional obligations of legal
practitioners 170 but also with pro se parties, amateurs, and other professionals
See, e.g., Carol M. Bast & Susan W. Harrell, Ethical Obligations: Performing Adequate
Legal Research and Legal Writing, 29 NOVA L. REV. 49, 49 (2004) (“Failure to adequately

165

research or write well, or both, is a violation of ethics rules and can result in a reprimand,
suspension, or disbarment from the practice of law; a client may decide that it is the basis of
a legal malpractice lawsuit.”); Daniel E. Pinnington, The Biggest Malpractice Risks, AM. BAR
ASS’N
(Apr.
2,
2019),
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/gpsolo/publications/gp_solo/2011/march/the_biggest_
malpractice_claim_risks/ [https://perma.cc/K63L-W9CF] (failing to know or apply
substantive law is the most common malpractice error that a lawyer can commit); Sarah
Lamdan, When Westlaw Fuels ICE Surveillance: Legal Ethics in the Era of Big Data
Policing, 43 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 255, 284 (2019) (“Lawyers need computerassisted legal research to do their jobs, as proper legal research is necessary to avoid
malpractice.”).
Street & Hansen, supra note 10, at 211.
Code Revision Comm’n for Gen. Assembly of Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, Inc., 906
F.3d 1229, 1232 (11th Cir. 2018).
Brief for the Petitioners at 2, Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, Inc., 140 S. Ct. 1498 (2020)
(No. 18-1150), 2019 WL 4075096 (“[T]he law itself is not copyrightable.”); Brief of
Respondent, supra 43, at *1 (“[L]egal works ‘published under the authority of’ the State are
not the proper subject of private copyright.” (quoting Callaghan v. Myers, 128 U.S. 617, 649–
50 (1888)).
See Nash v. Lathrop, 6 N.E. 559, 560 (1886) (“Every citizen is presumed to know the law
thus declared, and it needs no argument to show that justice requires that all should have free
access to the opinions, and that it is against sound public policy to prevent this, or to suppress
and keep from the earliest knowledge of the public the statutes, or the decisions and opinions
of the justices.”).
MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT, Preamble 6 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983) (“As a member of
a learned profession, a lawyer should cultivate knowledge of the law beyond its use for clients,
employ that knowledge in reform of the law and work to strengthen legal education.”).
166
167

168

169

170

1000

MITCHELL HAMLINE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 47

striving for legal compliance in their jobs and daily lives. 171 Although less
“straightforward” than the Court’s “just look to the author” approach, the
Eleventh Circuit’s markers are more consistent with the Copyright Act and
the Court’s historical approach to determining copyrightability based on the
work itself, rather than the work’s author.

C.

Implications for Technical Manuals, Standards, Building Codes, and
Other Law-Like Materials

While Public.Resource.Org can understandably be pleased with
the ruling in its favor, the Roberts opinion may have a limiting (if not fatal)
impact on separate pending litigation to which Public.Resource.Org is a
party. 172 In American Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM) v.
Public.Resource.Org, Inc., private organizations that develop technical
standards later incorporated by reference into law sued
Public.Resource.Org for copyright and trademark infringement after it
distributed those standards on the internet. 173
Although these standards may be “boring [and] technical,” 174 the fact
is that “Federal, state, and local governments . . . have incorporated by
reference thousands of these standards into law.” 175 As a result of copyright
restrictions, these privately created, nongovernment works are sometimes
only accessible at a cost and may not be copied or shared with others. 176 Yet,
many of these works carry equal weight to statutes since they have the
binding force of law. 177
Through public-private partnerships, hundreds of private SDOs
develop technical and industry-specific standards in the United States, many
of which are followed by the government at the federal, state, and local
level. 178 In fact, federal statute and executive branch policy promote the
adoption of these privately authored works into federal laws and
See LawResourceOrg, Show Me the Manual, YOUTUBE (July 14, 2012),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2tOJdGaMvVw
[https://perma.cc/QCX6-KLT2]
[hereinafter Show Me the Manual].
Am. Soc’y for Testing & Materials v. Public.Resource.Org, Inc., 896 F.3d 437, 458 (D.C.
Cir. 2018) (vacating permanent injunctions against defendant, Public.Recourse.Org, Inc.,
and reversing district court’s denial of summary judgement against defendant’s fair use
defense claim under the Copyright Act).
Id. at 444.
Show Me the Manual, supra note 171.
Am. Soc’y for Testing & Materials, 896 F.3d at 440.
Show Me the Manual, supra note 171.
Am. Soc’y for Testing & Materials, 896 F.3d at 440.
171

172

173
174
175
176
177

The Scope of Copyright Protection: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Cts., Intell. Prop.
& the Internet of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. 1–2 (2014) (statement of
178

Patricia Griffin, Vice President and General Counsel, American National Standards
Institute) [hereinafter Griffin].
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regulations. 179 In 1995, Congress passed the National Technology Transfer
and Advancement Act which directs “all Federal agencies and departments
[to] use technical standards that are developed or adopted by voluntary
consensus standards bodies, using such technical standards as a means to
carry out policy objectives or activities determined by the agencies and
departments.” 180 As of August 2016, over 24,000 standards were
incorporated by reference into the Code of Federal Regulation. 181 This
represents a 250 percent increase in the number of privately developed
standards incorporated by reference over a four year period. 182
Pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), federal
agencies must publish in the Federal Register “substantive rules of general
applicability adopted as authorized by law, and statements of general policy
or interpretations of general applicability formulated and adopted by the
agency.” 183 This mandate, which serves as a means of public notice—a key
requirement under the principle of the rule of law 184—may be achieved when
privately authored standards are incorporated by reference. 185 According to
the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), incorporation
by reference is “used primarily to make privately developed technical
standards Federally enforceable” and has the legal effect of treating the
material “as if it were published in the Federal Register and [Code of
Federal Regulations].” 186
Under implementing regulations, federal agencies must summarize
the material to be incorporated by reference in the rulemaking process and
“[d]iscuss, in the preamble of the final rule, the ways that the materials it
incorporates by reference are reasonably available to interested parties and
179

Id.

National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-113, §
12(d)(1), 110 Stat. 775 (1996) (codified at 15 U.S.C. 3701 note); see also OFF. OF MGMT. &
BUDGET, EXEC. OFF. OF THE PRESIDENT, OMB CIRCULAR NO. A-119, REVISED, FEDERAL
PARTICIPATION IN THE DEVELOPMENT AND USE OF VOLUNTARY CONSENSUS STANDARDS
AND IN CONFORMITY ASSESSMENT ACTIVITIES (1998) (“All federal agencies must use
voluntary consensus standards in lieu of government-unique standards in their procurement
and regulatory activities, except where inconsistent with law or otherwise impractical.”)
[hereinafter OMB CIRCULAR NO. A-119].
NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS AND TECH., STANDARDS INC. BY REFERENCE DATABASE,
https://sibr.nist.gov/ [https://perma.cc/6V2A-KUBH] (“This database has not been updated
180

181

since August 16, 2016 and is being provided as a source for historical data.”).
Compare id. with Bremmer, supra note 117, at 150.

182
183

Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(1)(D) (2021).

Overview - Rule of Law, supra note 114 (“Rule of law is a principle under which all persons,

184

institutions, and entities are accountable to laws that are: [p]ublicly promulgated . . . .”).
5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(1).
Code of Federal Regulations Incorporation by Reference, U.S. NAT’L ARCHIVES AND REC.
ADMIN.: FED. REG., (Oct. 10, 2019), https://www.archives.gov/federal-register/cfr/ibrlocations.html [https://perma.cc/H8NA-BA6L].
185
186
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how interested parties can obtain the materials.” 187 The term “interested
parties” deviates from the statute itself, which directs that matters required
to be published in the Federal Register be made “reasonably available to the
class of persons affected thereby.” 188 As explained by NARA, which
declined to define the term “class of persons,” this subtle change “could be
read as an indication that the [material incorporated by reference] must be
reasonably available to those who must directly comply with the
regulation.” 189 During the rulemaking process, comments were submitted to
NARA encouraging the agency to make these materials available to any
person, but the agency noted that FOIA makes it “acceptable to have
material reasonably available beyond the class of persons affected but it is
not required.” 190
The Federal Incorporation by Reference Rule’s reasonable
availability requirement represents a balance between U.S. copyright law,
U.S. international trade obligations, and agencies’ ability to substantively
regulate under their authorizing statutes. 191 Although not directly addressed
in statutory law, executive branch policy expressly directs federal agencies
to “observe and protect the rights of the copyright holder[s]” when a
voluntary standard “is used and published in an agency document.” 192 While
NARA takes the position that “when the Federal government references
copyrighted works, those works should not lose their copyright,” 193 case law
not yet considered by the Supreme Court suggests a more nuanced rule
emerging from the lower courts. It is unclear whether the rule pronounced
by the Court in Public.Resource.Org augments or displaces the lower
courts’ incorporation by reference jurisprudence.
In Building Officials & Code Administration v. Code Technology,
Inc., the First Circuit considered whether the principle “that judicial
opinions and statutes are in the public domain and are not subject to
copyright” applied to “state-promulgated administrative regulations which
are modelled on a privately developed code.” 194 Building Officials and Code
Administration (BOCA), a private SDO, developed building codes which
the Commonwealth of Massachusetts adopted into its law, with minor statespecific modifications. 195 After Code Technology, Inc. copied the official
code from state sources and redistributed the material, BOCA obtained a
187
188
189
190
191
192
193
194
195

1 C.F.R. § 51.5(a)(1) (2015).
5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(1).
Incorporation by Reference, 79 Fed. Reg. 66276 (Nov. 7, 2014).

Id.
Id.

OMB CIRCULAR NO. A-119, supra note 180.
Incorporation by Reference, supra note 189.
Bldg. Officials & Code Adm. v. Code Tech., Inc., 628 F.2d 730, 734 (1st Cir. 1980).
Id. at 731.
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preliminary injunction from a trial court to prevent further distribution of
the material. 196 Amid extensive exploration of the government edicts
doctrine, the First Circuit reversed, claiming (unconvincingly) that its ruling
was not based upon the underlying legal issues. 197
BOCA argued that section 105 of the Copyright Act, which
expressly disclaims copyright abridgement by the Federal Government’s
own publication of copyright material, creates a state analogy whereby “a
state’s use of copyrighted material cannot affect its copyright protection.” 198
The circuit court characterized this argument as a “misunderstanding” of
congressional intent. 199 Comparing section 8 of the 1909 copyright statute,
which barred “any publication of the United States government” from
copyright protection, to section 105 of the new Act, which excludes from
copyright protection any “work of the United States government”—a defined
term in the statute—the court concluded that Congress had specifically
sought to ameliorate the “danger” created by the ambiguity of the 1909 law
“that privately written and copyrighted works would lose protection simply
by inclusion in a government publication.” 200 Thus, the court found “section
105 of the Federal Copyright Act, and its predecessor section 8 of the old
Act, do not protect BOCA’s material against the loss of its copyright
protection through adoption as state law.” 201 Critically, the court also
distinguished the adoption of copyright material into law “from mere
publication by the government.” 202
More than a decade after the First Circuit’s decision, the Second
Circuit considered a fact pattern which it decided was clearly too
comparable to a government’s mere reference to a work of authorship for
such work to be considered an edict of government. In CCC Information
Services, Inc. (CCC) v. Maclean Hunter Market Reports, Maclean appealed
a judgement by a lower court that its Automobile Red Book—Official Used
Car Valuations (the “Red Book”) was uncopyrightable. 203 CCC, the alleged
infringer of the work, provided customers with automobile valuations based
on the Red Book, which was also used under the laws of several states to
calculate minimum insurance payments for the “total loss” of a vehicle. 204
196
197

Id. at 731–32.
See generally id. at 732–36. Despite claiming to “leave the door slightly ajar” with respect

to the legal merits, the court was unmistakably clear that BOCA’s works were government
edicts ineligible for copyright protection. Id. at 736.
Id. at 735.
198
199
200
201
202

Id.
Id.
Id. at 736.
Id. at 735.

CCC Information Services, Inc. v. Maclean Hunter Market Reports, 44 F.3d 61, 63 (2d
Cir. 1994).
Id. at 64.
203
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Distinguishing the case before it from Building Officials & Code
Administration, the Second Circuit reversed the court below and concluded
that Maclean had a valid copyright, stating that it was “not prepared to hold
that a state’s reference to a copyrighted work as a legal standard for valuation
results in loss of the copyright” despite compelling “policy considerations
that support CCC’s argument.” 205
The Ninth Circuit considered another incorporation by reference
from a case in 1997 involving a medical procedure code developed by the
American Medical Association (AMA). 206 Pursuant to an act of Congress
requiring the Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA) to establish a
uniform code for identifying physicians’ services for use in completing
Medicare and Medicaid claim forms, HCFA contracted with the AMA to
use its privately-developed code. 207 After the code was incorporated by
reference into HCFA rules through the Code of Federal Regulations,
Practice Management, a publisher and distributor of medical books, sought
declaratory judgement that the AMA authored code lost its copyright
protection once incorporated by reference in HFCA regulations. 208
Like the First Circuit in BOCA and the Second Circuit in CCC, the
Ninth Circuit was unwilling to abrogate the AMA’s copyright protection due
to the mere reference of its code in federal regulations. 209 Moreover, the
court reasoned that there was no evidence that incorporation by reference
limited public access to the AMA’s code 210 and agreed with the AMA that
“invalidating its copyright on the ground that the [code] entered the public
domain when HCFA required its use would expose copyrights on a wide
range of privately authored model codes, standards, and reference works to
invalidation.” 211 This, the court explained, would undermine the purpose of
copyright to promote the arts and sciences. 212
In a more recent appeals court case, Veeck v. Southern Building
Code Congress, Inc., the Fifth Circuit considered “the extent to which a
private organization may assert copyright protection for its model codes,
after the models have been adopted by a legislative body and become ‘the

205
206

Id. at 74.

Prac. Mgmt. Info. Corp. v. Am. Med. Ass’n, 121 F.3d 516 (9th Cir. 1997).

Id. at 517. HCFA is now known as the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS).
HCFA Becomes CMS, EMERGENCY MED. NEWS (Sept. 2001), https://journals.lww.com/em207

news/fulltext/2001/09000/hcfa_becomes_cms.18.aspx#:~:text=The%20Health%20Care%2
0Financing%20Administration,and%20Medicaid%20Services%20 [https://perma.cc/TSV8X6ZX].
Prac. Mgmt. Info. Corp., 121 F.3d at 518.
See id. at 519–20.
Id. at 519.

208
209
210
211
212

Id.
Id. at 518.
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law.’” 213 The controversy arose when Veeck, a private website operator,
posted the building codes of two Texas municipalities, which were based on
a model code developed by Southern Building Code Congress
International, Inc. (SBCCI). 214
In a split decision, the court determined that “SBCCI is the ‘author’
of model building codes that, qua model building codes, are facially
copyright-protected.” 215 Nevertheless, the court held that “as law, the model
codes enter the public domain and are not subject to the copyright holder’s
exclusive prerogatives.” 216 The majority explained that under the merger
doctrine, the codes became ineligible for copyright protection once the
work was incorporated into the cities’ municipal code. 217 The court
distinguished its ruling from other cases based on the important fact that the
code in Veeck was “promoted by its author, SBCCI, precisely for use as
legislation,” 218 whereas “other voluntary consensus standards are usually
‘created by private groups for reasons other than incorporation into law.’” 219
According to Emily S. Bremmer, “Veeck and related cases show
that the scope of copyright protection for privately authored materials used
in the law depends upon a variety of factors, including the nature of the
material at issue, the purpose for which it was created, and the way the
government uses it.” 220 For example, the government’s mere reference to a
privately authored work incorporated by reference into law does not
automatically invalidate its copyright. On the other hand, wholesale
adoption of privately authored works into law may cause it to lose copyright
protection as law, especially if the law is binding on the public. 221
Furthermore, whether the government participates in the standards
development process and whether the SDO promotes the adoption of its
works into law are also relevant factors in assessing the copyrightability of
the material.

213
214
215
216
217

293 F.3d 791, 793 (5th Cir. 2002) (en banc).

Id. at 801.
Id. at 800.
Id. at 793 (emphasis in original).
Id. at 801–02. “If an idea is susceptible to only one form of expression, the merger doctrine

applies and § 102(b) excludes the expression from the Copyright Act. As the Supreme Court
has explained it, this ‘idea/expression dichotomy strike[s] a definitional balance between the
First Amendment and the Copyright Act by permitting free communication of facts while
still protecting an author’s expression.’” Id. at 801 (quoting Harper & Row Publishers, Inc.
v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 556 (1985).
Id. at 804 (citing CCC Info. Services v. Maclean Hunter Market Reports, Inc., 44 F.3d 61
(2nd Cir.1994); Practice Management Info. Corp. v. American Medical Ass’n, 121 F.3d 516
(9th Cir. 1997), opinion amended by 133 F.3d 1140 (9th Cir. 1998)).
Bremmer, supra note 117, at 169 (quoting Veeck, 293 F.3d at 804–05).
218

219
220
221

Id.
See id.
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Considering Public.Resource.Org’s mission and history, it is not
surprising that it, too, is involved in a dispute over the copyrightability of
privately authored standards incorporated by reference into law. In ASTM,
Malamud’s organization was sued by six SDOs for publishing hundreds of
their privately-authored standards on the internet. 222 The trial court granted
partial summary judgement in favor of the SDOs and issued injunctions to
prevent Public.Resource.Org from redistributing the works. 223 On appeal,
the D.C. Circuit reversed and remanded, finding that the lower court did
not properly consider Public.Resource.Org’s fair use defense, “and le[ft] for
another day the question of whether the Constitution permits copyright to
persist in works incorporated by reference into law.” 224
Although the court of appeals did not reach a conclusion on the
merits of Public.Resource.Org’s claim that the SDO’s standards were
uncopyrightable, the court considered the various jurisdictional processes
by which works are incorporated by reference into law and also the varying
legal consequences of incorporation. 225 Depicting the process and its
consequences as a spectrum, the court found that “[a]t one end of this
spectrum lie incorporated standards that define one’s legal obligations . . .
except that the specific legal requirements are found outside the two covers
of the codebook.” 226 On “the other end of the spectrum lie standards that
serve as mere references but have no direct legal effect on any private party’s
conduct.” 227 This analysis gives a subtle nod to the reasoning used by circuit
courts in other incorporation by reference cases, including BOCA, CCC,
and Veeck. Also, like the Eleventh Circuit’s ruling in Public.Resource.Org,
it makes for at least the fourth circuit court to evaluate the copyrightability
of law and law-like works in terms of the process of its creation and its
authoritativeness or binding effect. 228 This is in stark contrast to the Supreme
Court’s approach of determining copyright protection based solely on the
identity of the author.
Public.Resource.Org’s victory at the Supreme Court may come at
the expense of losing this separate but related legal fight. Had the majority
in Public.Resource.Org adopted the “three marker” test used by the
Eleventh Circuit, Public.Resource.Org might be on stronger footing in its
campaign to free technical standards carrying the force of law from copyright
restrictions. In fact, many organizations that filed briefs in support of
Am. Soc’y for Testing and Materials v. Public.Resource.Org, Inc. 896 F.3d 437 (D.C. Cir.
2018).
Id. at 440.
Id. at 447.
Id. at 441–42.
Id. at 442–43.
Id. at 443.

222
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224
225
226
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228

See generally id.
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Georgia 229 out of concern that the Court might adopt a broader rule
sweeping in these legal materials should be pleased that the majority’s
opinion may have put those materials entirely out of scope of the
government edicts doctrine before ever hearing a case on the matter. This
is so because privately authored works adopted by reference into legislative
enactments only satisfy one of the Court’s two requirements under the rule
adopted by the majority in Public.Resource.Org. 230 Here, again,
“authorship” is the critical factor. Because organizations like the American
Society for Testing and Materials are not legislators or judges, the rule
adopted in Public.Resource.Org would likely preclude the government
edicts doctrine from applying to their works of authorship once
incorporated into administrative regulations.
Assuming that these types of works retain copyright protection and
do not fall under the government edicts doctrine, there are two likely ways
to open access to this information. Legislatures could enact these standards
in their entirety (as opposed to adoption by reference), in which case they
would likely lose their copyright protection. Alternitively, parties could
assert a fair use defense. Both approaches have drawbacks.
Prior to the Court’s decision in Public.Resource.Org, Malamud
confidently argued that “even if the law is created by a private party, once it
is enacted as the law of the land, anybody can make copies.” 231 The
Public.Resource.Org Court’s decision proves Malamud wrong. 232
Government copying of privately authored original work—even when
adopted into law—would likely constitute a “taking” of private property for
public use under the Takings Clause of the Constitution, which would
require the government to pay just compensation. 233 Some argue that this
See, e.g., Brief for American Society for Testing and Materials d/b/a/ ASTM International
(“ASTM”) as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, Inc., 140
S. Ct. 1498 (2020) (No. 18-1150), 2019 WL 4192161; Brief for International Code Council,
Inc. and the American Gas Association as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Georgia v.
Public.Resource.Org, Inc., 140 S. Ct. 1498 (2020) (No. 18-1150), 2019 WL 4235528
[hereinafter Amicus Brief for Int’l Code Council & Am. Gas Ass'n].
See Public.Resource.Org, 140 S Ct. at 1508.
Carl Malamud, Three Revolutions in American Law, PUBLIC.RESOURCE.ORG (Oct. 22–
23, 2009) (“A good example of this are our public safety codes: the building codes, fire codes,
electrical, plumbing, boiler, fuel & gas, and the other codes that govern our daily lives.”).
See Public.Resource.Org, Inc., 140 S. Ct. at 1506 (holding that the government edicts
doctrine “does not apply . . . to works created by government officials (or private parties)
who lack the authority to make or interpret the law . . . .”).
U.S. CONST. amend V. Prior to the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Supreme
Court held that the Bill of Rights did not apply to the states. Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S.
243, 250–51 (1833). However, under the incorporation doctrine, portions of the first ten
amendments to the Constitution are applicable to the states through the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In the late 19th Century, the Court ruled that when
“private property is taken for the state or under its direction for public use, without
229
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231
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would undermine the purpose of copyright altogether because it would
create a disincentive for standards-setting bodies and other private parties
from developing model codes for which they have a “unique” and
specialized expertise to “develop very technical areas of the law,” like fire
and building safety. 234 However, others have suggested that “any Takings
Clause problem evaporates if the copyright owner has encouraged or
permitted the government entity to incorporate the copyrighted work into
its laws.” 235 The Copyright Act itself states:
When an individual author’s ownership of a copyright . . .
has not previously been transferred voluntarily by that
individual author, no action by any governmental body or
other official or organization purporting to seize,
expropriate, transfer, or exercise rights of ownership with
respect to the copyright, or any of the exclusive rights under
a copyright, shall be given effect. 236
Although “[t]here is no strict formula assessing a Takings Clause
237
claim,” the Supreme Court has identified (1) “[t]he economic impact of
the regulation on the claimant,” (2) “the extent to which the regulation has
interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations,” and (3) “the
character of the governmental action” as “several factors that have particular
significance.” 238 The Veeck court found neither a Copyright Act nor a
Taking Clause violation “because SBCCI urged localities to adopt its model
codes.” 239 Thus, the issue in cases involving governmental adoption of
model codes “is not the voluntariness of the appropriation but the legal
consequences flowing from the permission” that SBCCI gave. 240
compensation made or secured to the owner, is, upon principle and authority, wanting in the
due process of law required by the fourteenth amendment of the constitution of the United
States.” Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. City of Chi., 166 U.S. 226, 241 (1897).
As recently observed by a unanimous Court, “[c]opyrights are a form of property.” Allen v.
Cooper, 140 S. Ct. 994, 1004 (2020) (citing Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 128
(1932)).
American University Washington College of Law, Program on Information Justice and
Intellectual Property, IP at the Supreme Court Series: Georgia v. Public.Resources.Org, Inc.,
YOUTUBE
(Dec.
2,
2019),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OcposI6qZE&feature=youtu.be [https://perma.cc/8HXF-DE7D] (comment by panelist Amy Chai).
Amicus Brief for Int’l Code Council & Am. Gas Ass’n, supra note 229, at 15 (citing Veeck
v. S. Bldg. Code Cong. Int’l, Inc. 293 F.3d 791, 803 (5th Cir. 2002) (en banc)).
17 U.S.C. § 201(e). This section of the Copyright Act applies narrowly to copyrights owned
by individuals, rather than SDOs.
Int’l Code Council, Inc. v. UpCodes, Inc., No. 1:17-CV-06261, 2020 WL 2750636, at *13
(S.D.N.Y. May 27, 2020).
Penn. Ct. Trans. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
Veeck, 293 F.3d at 803.
Int’l Code Council, Inc., No. 1:17-CV-06261, 2020 WL 2750636, at *14 (quoting Veeck,
293 F.3d at 794, 803).
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Regardless, this debate may be purely academic because of the
Supreme Court’s ruling in Allen v. Cooper, another copyright case decided
a month before Public.Resource.Org. In that case, the Court held that an
act of Congress abrogating states’ immunity from copyright infringement
suits was unconstitutional, despite the legislature’s clear language. 241 The
ruling therefore calls into question what effective remedy a SDO would have
against government copying of protected works of original authorship into
state statutes and regulation. Although private persons could still seek
injunctive relief against a state for copyright infringement, it is hard to
imagine the judicial branch interfering with a state legislature’s ability to
make laws. 242 Based on the Court’s reasoning in Allen, 243 it appears likely that
Congress would have to identify a pattern of states infringing on copyrights
through state laws and provide for a narrow cause of action against the states
tailored toward such behavior in order to pass muster under the Fourteenth
Amendment.
Alternatively, these standards could be copied without constituting
infringement under the fair use doctrine, 244 “which permits unauthorized
copying in some circumstances, so as to further copyright’s very purpose,
‘[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.’” 245 However, as the
Roberts opinion notes in Public.Resource.Org, “that defense, designed to
accommodate First Amendment concerns, is notoriously fact sensitive and
often cannot be resolved without a trial.” 246 This is because the application
of the fair use doctrine depends on the use of a multifactor test that weighs
all factors in light of the circumstances. 247

Allen v. Cooper, 140 S. Ct. 994, 1007 (2020) (“[T]he balance the [Copyright Clarification
Remedy Act] strike[s] between constitutional wrong and statutory remedy is . . . askew” under
the Court’s “congruence and proportionality” test for determining whether a state’s sovereign
immunity can be overcome by proper congressional enforcement of the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause).
In response to a request from members of the House Judiciary Committee, the United
States Register for Copyrights reported to Congress that “injunctive relief, which would be
the only remedy available in copyright infringement cases against states if states have Eleventh
Amendment immunity, is inadequate as a deterrence to copyright infringement.” H.R. REP.
NO. 101–282, at 3 (1989) (quoting REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS, COPYRIGHT LIABILITY OF
STATES iv (1988)).
140 S. Ct. at 1003–07.
17 U.S.C. § 107.
Campbell v. Acuff–Rose Music, Inc. 510 U.S. 569, 575 (1994) (quoting U.S. CONST., art.
I, § 8, cl. 8).
Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, Inc., 140 S. Ct. 1498, 1513 (2020) (citing Harper & Row,
Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 552 (1985)).
See, e.g., Authors Guild v. Google, Inc. 804 F.3d 202, 213–14 (2d Cir. 2015) (“The statute
‘calls for case-by-case analysis’” and recognizing that “some of the statute’s four listed [fair
use] factors are more significant than others.”) (quoting Campbell, 510 U.S. at 577).
241
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In ASTM, the D.C. Circuit considered three factors relevant to a
fair use analysis in the context of works incorporated by reference into law.
First, where an SDO makes copies of its standards online in a “controlled
reading room,” how much additional harm does the alleged infringer cause
to the market of such standards? 248 Second, “wholesale copying may be
unjustified if a law incorporates by reference only a few select provisions of
a much longer standard.” 249 And finally, “how, if at all, does the infringement
affect the market for derivative works, particularly considering that the
standards are regularly updated and that the private parties most interested
in the standards would presumably remain interested in having the most upto-date ones?” 250
At least one incorporation by reference case decided a month after
the Supreme Court’s decision in Public.Resource.Org analyzed an SDO’s
copyright infringement claim using several guideposts beyond mere
authorship, suggesting that the Court’s ruling may not go so far as to occupy
the incorporation by reference field as the author of this Paper believes it
might. In International Code Council, Inc. v. UpCodes, Inc., the Southern
District of New York considered a copyright infringement claim by the
International Code Council (ICC), a SDO founded by three predecessor
SDOs which merged in 1994, including SBCCI, against a web-based startup
that provides “easy and convenient access to materials of particular
importance to members of the architecture, engineering, and construction
(‘AEC’) industries.” 251
Like in Veeck, the ICC produced model codes which were adopted
into law through a multi-step process which “involves significant
participation by government representatives, who compose at least one-third
of each committee and vote on important decisions regarding changes to
the model codes.” 252 On cross-motions for summary judgement, the trial
court considered the relevant case law, including the Public.Resource.Org
and Veeck decisions, from which it summarized five “guideposts to assess
whether notice of the purported copyrighted work is needed for a person to
have notice of ‘the law,’” including:
(1) whether the private author intended or encouraged the
work’s adoption into law; (2) whether the work
comprehensively governs public conduct, such that it
resembles a ‘law of general applicability’; (3) whether the
Am. Soc’y for Testing and Materials v. Public.Resource.Org, Inc. 896 F.3d 437, 453 (D.C.
Cir. 2018).
248

249

Id.

Int’l Code Council, Inc. v. UpCodes, Inc., No. 1:17-CV-06261, 2020 WL 2750636, at *27
(S.D.N.Y. May 27, 2020) (citing Am. Soc’y for Testing & Materials, 896 F.3d at 453).
Id. at *3.
Id. at *2.
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work expressly regulates a broad area of private endeavor;
(4) whether the work provides penalties or sanctions for
violation of its contents; and (5) whether the alleged
infringer has published and identified the work as part of
the law, rather than the copyrighted material underlying the
law. 253
It is curious why the district court did not end its analysis by
concluding that the works are protected by copyright since they were simply
developed by a private party. Rather than limiting its analysis to the Supreme
Court’s holding in Public.Resource.Org that the government edicts doctrine
“does not apply . . . to works created by government officials (or private
parties) who lack the authority to make or interpret the law,” 254 the court
thought it significant that “these laws incorporate significant amounts of
material authored by a private entity rather than by government officials
empowered to speak with the force of law,” and therefore presented “an
unusual fact pattern that the author-focused Government Edicts doctrine
does not directly address.” 255 Instead, the court was guided by the “animating
principle” articulated in Public.Resource.Org that “‘no one can own the
law’” 256 and may have been persuaded that the fact pattern before it was more
like BOCA, CCC, and Veeck. This led it to conclude that the work was
uncopyrightable because it was more than merely referenced into law and
because the process by which the standards were created involved
government officials. 257 In other words, the multifactor approach taken by
the Eleventh Circuit may have felt to the district court like a more complete
and satisfying analysis through which to frame its decision than the Supreme
Court’s author-only reasoning.
Regardless of how the UpCode case proceeds, a key consideration
for SDOs following Public.Resource.Org is whether and to what extent
government officials are involved in the standards-development process. In
testimony before Congress, the representative of one SDO membership
organization touted that “federal, state, and local governments are active
partners in the development of standards and codes.” 258 At least in part, this
is because federal law and White House policy not only encourage but, in
fact, mandate participation 259 of federal agency officials in the development
253
254
255
256
257
258

Id. at *16.

Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, Inc., 140 S. Ct. 1498, 1507 (2020) (emphasis added).

Upcodes, Inc., No. 1:17-CV-06261, 2020 WL 2750636, at *8.
Id. (quoting Public.Resource.Org, 140 S. Ct. at 1507).
Id. at *10–13.
Griffin, supra note 178.

“Federal agencies and departments shall consult with voluntary, private sector, consensus
standards bodies and shall, when such participation is in the public interest and is compatible
with agency and departmental missions, authorities, priorities, and budget resources,
participate with such bodies in the development of technical standards.” National
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of voluntary standards “when consultation and participation is in the public
interest and is compatible with their missions, authorities, priorities, and
budget resources.” 260
Despite federal encouragement, under the Supreme Court’s
holding in Public.Resource.Org, the greater the participation of government
officials, the more likely the work would be considered uncopyrightable
based on the identity of the author. 261 This was observed by the court in
UpCode, which noted with particularity the fact that nearly one-third of the
ICC’s committees were comprised of government representatives who also
wielded votes on important decisions about the development of the codes. 262
While it remains to be seen whether and to what extent the level or amount
of participation by government officials in the development of standards
incorporated by reference into law is material to analyzing whether the
standards are a work of authorship by the government, it is possible that
either the Copyright Act 263 or recent case law could be used to conclude that
too much government involvement would render the material
uncopyrightable. In the alternative, a strict reading of the Court’s holding
limits the scope of the doctrine to judges and legislators, which would leave
administrative law promulgated by regulators out of scope.
Had the Eleventh Circuit’s approach to the government edicts
doctrine been upheld by the Supreme Court, there is a greater likelihood
that other privately authored materials carrying the force of law might lose
copyright protection. Without relying on authorship alone, courts would be
free to conclude that the binding effect or authoritativeness of a privately
authored work bears a close enough resemblance to traditional notions of
law to be edicts of government. Instead, under a strict reading of the Court’s
ruling, many privately authored standards incorporated by reference into
law will retain their copyright protection unless the Court’s ruling
supplements rather than supersedes the circuit courts’ incorporation by

Technology Transfer and Advancement Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-113, § 11(d)(2), 110
Stat. 775 (1996) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 3701).
OMB CIRCULAR NO. A-119, supra note 180; see also SUBCOMMITTEE ON STANDARDS,
NAT’L SCI. & TECH. COUNCIL, EXEC. OFF. OF THE PRESIDENT, Federal Engagement in
260

Standards Activities to Address National Priorities: Background and Proposed
Recommendations (Oct. 10, 2011) (“Agencies should consider participating in standardsetting activities in order to maintain awareness of emerging revisions.”).
At a minimum, the Court’s ruling in Public.Resource.Org covers judges and legislators. It
appears likely that other government officials in administrative agencies, for example, could
also covered based on the First Circuit’s decision in BOCA.
Int’l Code Council, Inc. v. UpCodes, Inc., No. 1:17-CV-06261, 2020 WL 2750636, at *2
(S.D.N.Y. May 27, 2020).
See 17 U.S.C. § 105 (excluding works of the United States Government from copyright
protection). This restriction under the Copyright Act is not applicable to state or local
government officials.
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reference jurisprudence. By not addressing this directly, the Court leaves
unresolved the future of public access to these law-like materials.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The U.S. Supreme Court’s expansion of the government edicts
doctrine in Public.Resource.Org should reassure those who believe that no
one can own the law. The majority appropriately decided that all works
authored by legislators and judges acting in their official capacity are not
copyrightable. This is a victory for open access to the law and will hopefully
encourage states and other jurisdictions with the power to enact laws to
make government edicts and “law-like” materials recognized under their
laws widely available. This could promote greater citizen understanding of
the law and a more learned society.
Despite the generally positive result of Public.Resource.Org, the
Supreme Court only partially moved the needle for those who would like
to promote greater access to the law and other legal materials. The Eleventh
Circuit’s “three marker” test for determining whether a work is sufficiently
law-like to lose copyright protection was more in line with the Copyright Act
and offered advocates for open access to the “raw materials” of the law a
better chance at furthering pending cases that would break down legal
barriers to the law.
By looking at the author alone to determine whether a work is a
government edict, the diverse group of Justices that sided with
Public.Resources.Org overemphasized one element of the Copyright Act to
the exclusion of others. The full impact of their ruling will not be known for
some time, but it may give comfort to technical standards-setting bodies and
other private groups that copyright works later incorporated into law.
Unfortunately for Public.Resource.Org and other advocates for open access
to the law, the Roberts opinion might be construed as leaving those works
out of scope of the government edicts doctrine.

